

RECLAIMING LOCAL WISDOM FOR RELIGIOUS MODERATION: The Case of *Buatulo Toulongo* in Gorontalo, Indonesia

Andries Kango & Donald Qomaidiasyah Tungkagi

IAIN Sultan Amai Gorontalo

Jl. Sultan Amai, Pone, Kec. Limboto Bar., Kabupaten Gorontalo 96181, Indonesia

e-mail: andres_kango@iaingorontalo.co.id; donaldtungkagi@iaingorontalo.ac.id

Abstract: This study investigates the role of *Buatulo Toulongo* as a local wisdom-based mechanism for countering religious radicalism in Gorontalo Province, Indonesia. The research addresses three questions: how the *Buatulo Toulongo* mechanism functions, what challenges threaten its sustainability, and how it can be revitalized as a strategy for promoting religious moderation. Using an institutional ethnography approach, the study was conducted in three regencies/municipalities through in-depth interviews, participant observation in fifteen mosques, and documentary analysis. The findings show that *Buatulo Toulongo* operates as a tripartite safeguard system at structural, cultural, and operational levels. Structurally, it creates checks and balances on religious authority; culturally, it transmits *wasathiyyah* values through local identity and communal traditions; operationally, it acts as an early warning system based on social capital and community networks. However, the mechanism faces significant challenges, including modernization, leadership regeneration crises, ideological competition, geographical vulnerability, and weak institutional support. The study concludes that revitalization requires integrated policy measures, including regional regulations, leadership cadre strengthening, curriculum integration, and gender inclusion. These findings highlight the strategic role of local wisdom in strengthening community resilience and advancing religious moderation in Indonesia.

Keywords: *Buatulo Toulongo*, Gorontalo, radicalism, religious moderation, local wisdom

Corresponding Author	Andries Kango			
Article history	Submitted: December 15, 2025	Revision : March 10, 2026	Accepted : March 13, 2026	Published : Mei 26, 2026
How to cite article	Kango, Andries and Donald Qomaidiasyah Tungkagi. "RECLAIMING LOCAL WISDOM FOR RELIGIOUS MODERATION: The Case of <i>Buatulo Toulongo</i> in Gorontalo, Indonesia." <i>MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-ilmu Keislaman</i> 50, no. 1 (2026): 311-330. http://dx.doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v50i1.1747			

Introduction

Religious radicalism has emerged as a serious threat to security and social cohesion in the 21st century, not only in the Middle East but also in Southeast Asia,¹ a region that is home to nearly 300 million Muslims, approximately 14 percent of the global Muslim population, yet remains frequently overlooked by analysts of global Islam.² Indonesia, the country with the world's largest Muslim population, faces a paradox that is difficult to ignore: while it is widely perceived as moderate and tolerant, the past two decades have witnessed a proliferation of exclusivist groups that are transforming the character of Nusantara Islam toward more puritanical and confrontational variants.³

In response, the Indonesian government has adopted religious moderation as a key policy paradigm, defined through four pillars: national commitment, tolerance, anti-violence, and accommodation of local culture.⁴ This policy is top-down in nature, implemented through the Ministry of Religious Affairs and national regulations in the form of training programs and public dissemination campaigns.⁵ However, this state-dominated approach has often been criticized for tending to become a bureaucratic-political project rather than a living social movement. Moreover, it risks enabling the state to dictate religious interpretations in order to control religious practices, thereby marginalizing local traditions and beliefs.⁶ As a result, religious moderation programs that target only the cognitive domain and lack contextual grounding are considered to have failed in addressing social realities, thus inadvertently contributing to intolerance and the persistence of fanaticism.

A number of researchers have directed their attention to the dimension of local wisdom in countering radicalism. Concepts such as the indigenization (*pribumisasi*) of Islam, *Islam Nusantara*, and religious moderation have emerged as responses to Arabization, fundamentalism, and radicalism, with the principle of accommodating local culture serving as a key indicator of moderation.⁷ Several studies suggest that the reactualization of local traditions is more effective as a cultural strategy against radicalism than political-security oriented deradicalization approaches alone.⁸ Furthermore, Suleman et al. identify three typological models of Islamic moderation based on the interaction between *syari'ah* and local culture: the integrative model in Gorontalo, the negotiation model in Minangkabau, and the hegemonic model in Banten.⁹ These studies convincingly demonstrate that local wisdom is not merely a cultural ornament but an active social resource that can be mobilized for resistance.

It is here that the urgency of this study lies. *Buatulo Toulongo*, which literally means "three strands of civilization," represents the tripartite leadership system of Gorontalo: *Buatulo Bubato* (governmental authority), *Buatulo Syara'* (religious authority), and *Buatulo Baate* (customary authority).¹⁰ What distinguishes this system from ordinary customary councils is its explicit and structured presence within religio-social rituals, particularly in the mosque. However, this tradition is reported to be weakening, creating

new vulnerabilities that correlate directly with indications of increased penetration by intolerant ideologies.

Gorontalo presents a highly relevant yet paradoxical context. Known as the “*Serambi Madinah*,”¹¹ this province nonetheless ranked second highest in Indonesia for potential radicalism according to a 2017 Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT/ National Counterterrorism Agency) survey, with a score of 58.48%.¹² Between 2015 and 2022, nearly all districts and municipalities in Gorontalo became sites for the arrest of suspected terrorists, with at least eleven recorded arrests in 2022 alone.¹³ In 2024, Densus 88 apprehended a man affiliated with al-Qaeda.¹⁴ This paradox between a strong moderate identity and vulnerability to radicalism renders Gorontalo an ideal case study for examining the effectiveness of local wisdom-based protection mechanisms.

Based on the foregoing background, this study is designed to address three research questions: (1) How does the *Buatulo Toulongo* mechanism function in preserving religious moderation in the mosques of Gorontalo? (2) What structural, cultural, and operational challenges threaten its sustainability? (3) How can this system be revitalized as a local wisdom-based counter-radicalism strategy? This article aims not only to document the empirical practices of local tradition but also to contribute to the development of a theoretical framework for how traditional institutions can be operationalized as a contextual mechanism of religious moderation.

Method

This study employs institutional ethnography,¹⁵ to reveal how social institutions operate, adapt, and negotiate with power within specific socio-political contexts. Unlike classical ethnography, institutional ethnography pays particular attention to texts, routines, and social coordination that shape institutional function.¹⁶ The main fieldwork was conducted in three regencies/municipalities in Gorontalo Province: Gorontalo City, Gorontalo Regency, and Bone Bolango Regency. Preliminary research and observation were carried out in 2022, subsequently enriched during May–July 2025 for additional data collection through in-depth interviews and triangulation. The total number of informants was seventeen, selected through a combination of purposive sampling and snowball sampling. Data collection employed three techniques: semi-structured in-depth interviews, participant observation in fifteen mosques, three Grand Mosques (*Masjid Agung*), six District Mosques (*Masjid Besar*), and six Congregational Mosques (*Masjid Jami'*), based on the typology of the Ministry of Religious Affairs,¹⁷ as well as document analysis. Data analysis was conducted using thematic analysis, in which data were categorized according to recurring thematic patterns and subsequently interpreted within relevant theoretical frameworks.

Results and Discussion

***Buatulo Toulongo*: Genealogy and Historical Relevance**

To understand why *Buatulo Toulongo* possesses effectiveness as a mechanism of moderation, it is necessary to grasp the historical context that shaped its authority within the collective imagination of the Gorontalo people. This system is the product of a prolonged process of political and religious consolidation. According to Lipoeto, the tripartite leadership system of Gorontalo was first institutionalized within the structure of the *Pohala'a*, a federation of kingdoms in Gorontalo that existed long before the arrival of Islam. When Islam arrived and was adopted as the royal religion around the sixteenth century, this leadership structure was not dismantled but was instead re-articulated within an Islamic framework.¹⁸

Buatulo Toulongo represents a refinement of the traditional Gorontalo governance system known as *Ungala'a*, which first emerged during the era of Matolodulada'a's rule and was later perfected into three strands by Sultan Amai around the 1500s. Subsequently, during the reign of Sultan Eyato beginning in the 1600s, it became known as "*Buatula Bantayo*," consisting of four pillars of governance: *Buatula Bantayo* (representatives of customary authorities), *Buatula Syara'*, *Buatula Bubato*, and *Buatula Bala*.¹⁹

This genealogical demonstrates that the system currently practiced in Gorontalo is in fact a variant that has undergone several refinements, rather than a static entity. Sultan Eyato, who reigned around 1631 CE, is regarded as a key figure who integrated the logic of Islamic caliphate into the local tripartite leadership system while simultaneously formulating the integrative philosophy of "*Adati hula-hula'a to sara'a, sara'a hula-hula'a to Kur'ani*" (customary law is grounded in Islamic law, and Islamic law is grounded in the Qur'an) which remains the religious ethos of the Gorontalo people to this day.²⁰

Historical relevance is significant: First, to explain why the three pillars of *Buatulo Toulongo*, governance, religious scholars (*'ulamâ'*), and customary law (*adat*), possess equal legitimacy and are mutually presuppositional rather than hierarchical. In this system, no single authority can claim a monopoly over the interpretation of truth, whether political truth, religious truth, or cultural truth.²¹ This inherently creates a mechanism of checks and balances that serves as the foundation for resistance against ideological monopoly, a key characteristic of radical movements.

Doe asserts that this system is by no means feudal, as its decision-making process is based on deliberation and consensus: "Through the adage, *wanu ito basarata huidu mali data* (if we engage in deliberation, a mountain can become level ground). Therefore, the *Buatulo Toulongo* system remains highly relevant in the present era, because the resulting decisions are profoundly dynamic and grounded in popular sovereignty."²²

Second, this historical continuity creates what Bourdieu terms *habitus*,²³

dispositions so deeply internalized that they appear “natural” to their practitioners. For the Gorontalo people who are socialized within this system, the presence of representatives from the three pillars in the mosque is not merely a formality but rather an expression of a cosmological order that has existed “since the time of the ancestors.” This habituated legitimacy endows *Buatulo Toulongo* with a cultural resilience that top-down government regulations or moderation programs alone do not possess.

The Value of Religious Moderation in *Buatulo Toulongo*

Perceptions of the *Buatulo Toulongo* system are not uniform across all regions of Gorontalo Province. This variation is primarily driven by regional diversity and the historical backgrounds of each area. Gorontalo City, as the territory of the former Kingdom of *Hulonthalo*, exhibits characteristics of meaning-making that differ from those of Gorontalo Regency, which once fell under the authority of the Kingdom of *Limutu* (Limbotu). Similarly, Bone Bolango Regency, as the former territory of the Kingdom of *Suwawa* (Tuwawa), enriches the spectrum of these perceptual differences. In other words, there is no single interpretation of *Buatulo Toulongo*; its understanding is distributed pluralistically in accordance with the trajectories of local political history in each region.

In the context of Limbotu, Daulima refers to *Buwatula Totolu* (the three strands of adab) as the foundation of customary leadership. Philosophically, *Buwatula Totolu* derives from the application of the *Tolo Lenggota* system: *Lenggota buhiliyo* (the dimension of birth/origin), *Lenggota oluwoliyo* (the dimension of maturity/life), and *Lenggota otoluliyo* (the dimension of returning to God). The essence of these dimensions is to attain three forms of nobility from God through three fundamental types of knowledge: knowing oneself, knowing God, and knowing His creation.²⁴

The values of religious moderation are reflected in twenty-five personal qualities that must be possessed by members of the *Buatulo Toulongo* as well as the Gorontalo people at large. These include: *dudelo* (personality), *totayowa* (morality), *o'ayuwa* (related to character), *poomilohu* (vision), *podungohu* (hearing response), *pohuhama* (opinion), *huhuta'a* (way of thinking), *heluma* (agreement), *bilohu* (brotherhood), *dulohupa* (deliberation), *awota* (social relation and a sense of unity), *ikiale* (be honest or trustworthy), *loyode* (mingle for simplicity and empathetic), *timamango* (be friendly and respectful), *woyoto* (be generous), *dupapa* (be noble and respect others), *pouda'a wawu tijuju* (respect others' opinions, viewpoints, ideas, and the like), *tinepo wawu tombula'a* (select and judge the attitude, personality, moral, and work of individuals), *dungoto* (love other human beings and the environment, the creator, and his creatures), *ponuwa* (affection and avoid mistakes and deviation), *huyula* (selfless social cooperation, sincere, concerned more with the needs of others than with one's own), *pi'ili* (commendable behavior, retain respect, and good example), *basalata* (act equally and fairly and be impartial), *balata yipilo* (be honest, sincere, trustworthy, responsible, and open to

criticism), *popoli* (attitudes and acts in solving problems, be accurate, firm, and complete).²⁵ These twenty-five values are encapsulated in the term “*Mo’odelo*,” which signifies sincere yet firm policy and wisdom, from both customary (*adat*) and *syari’ah* perspectives.²⁶ This value is reinforced as a mandate when a leader is ceremonially inaugurated according to custom, thereby aligning with the term “*Motolawupa*” as well as the content and essence embedded within *Buatulo Toulongo*.

Arkoun’s perspective on the necessity of distinguishing between “Tradition” (with a capital T), which is transcendental, eternal, and unchanging and “tradition” (with a lowercase t), which is the product of human history and culture, transmitted across generations or derived from interpretations of divine revelation in sacred texts,²⁷ is highly relevant to understanding *Buatulo Toulongo*. This system represents a tradition (small-t tradition) that developed historically in Gorontalo, yet it functions as a vehicle for preserving the moderate Tradition (capital-T Tradition) of Islam. In other words, *Buatulo Toulongo* does not claim to be an independent source of religious authority; rather, it serves as a cultural mechanism through which the great Tradition of Islam can be lived contextually without losing its essence.

Manifestation of *Buatulo Toulongo* in Religious Practice

The existence of *Buatulo Toulongo* in religious practice in Gorontalo cannot be separated from the hierarchical structure of mosque governance. The stratification of mosques in Gorontalo is divided into *Masjid Agung*, *Masjid Besar*, and *Masjid Jami’*. Within this hierarchy, the tripartite roles of *Bubato* (governmental authority), *Syara’* (religious authority), and *Baate* (customary authority) manifest themselves spatially and temporally.

Field observations in mosques across three regencies/municipalities revealed the manifestation of *Buatulo Toulongo*. Spatially, the manifestation of *Buatulo Toulongo* in the mosque encompasses three structured elements. The representative of *Buatulo Bubato* (generally the Regent/Mayor, Subdistrict Head, or Village Chief) occupies a position on the right side of the pulpit (*mimbar*), behind the *mihrab*; the representative of *Buatulo Syara’* (*Kadli* or senior *imam*, dressed in a robe and gold-embroidered cap) is positioned on the left side of the pulpit; meanwhile, the representative of *Buatulo Baate* has no fixed position, his role being to arrange the congregation’s rows. This positioning is not merely ceremonial; it carries a concrete supervisory function: from these positions, the representatives of the three pillars can observe the entire congregation and identify the presence of strangers or suspicious elements.




Figure 1. The Position of *Buatolo Toulongo* in Gorontalo Mosque Row



Figure 2. The *khatib* is escorted by the representatives during the delivery of the sermon after the Eid prayer

Suwandris explains the logic behind this spatial positioning: “...there is a representative from the government, a *qâdhi* or senior cleric, and a customary leader sitting in the front. This is not for prestige, but to show the congregation that this mosque is guarded by three pillars. If outsiders wish to enter with strange teachings, they will

first see who is present here.”²⁸ This statement reveals the symbolic communication function of the spatial positioning of *Buatulo Toulongo*: the physical presence of the representatives of the three authorities serves as a deterrent signal for parties intending to disseminate narratives that are not aligned with local values.

Farid Babuta describes in detail how this procession proceeds: “For the implementation of Friday prayers and the ‘Id prayers, officials from *Buatulo Syara’* pick up the prayer rug from the official residence, then bring it to the mosque to be spread in the place where the *Tauwa* (traditional/governmental leader) performs prayers. All the customary apparatus of *Buatulo Toulongo* are already present, waiting for the *Tauwa* or *ta Tombuluwo* to arrive. After they arrive, two *syar’i* officials (*Syarada’a*) immediately stand and face the *tauwa* to announce that the ‘Id prayer or Friday prayer is about to begin. After obtaining approval, the process of “*mohudu tunggudu*” (the ceremonial handover of the *khatib*’s staff) to the Friday preacher.”²⁹

Temporally, the presence of *Buatulo Toulongo* is not limited to worship. Observations at the Baiturrahman Grand Mosque showed that representatives of the three pillars arrive approximately thirty minutes before the call to prayer (*adzân*) to hold a brief coordination session with the mosque administrators (*ta’mîr*), discussing the sermon theme, verifying the preacher’s background, and identifying sensitive issues developing in the community. This confirms that *Buatulo Toulongo* functions as a pre-worship ideological filter, a mechanism not found in modern mosque management systems in other regions.

Nevertheless, there is concern that the presence of *Buatulo Toulongo* is increasingly being reduced to mere appearance without substance, present only in ritual and ceremonial aspects.³⁰ This criticism, though sharp, provides a productive analytical starting point, making it necessary to carefully map the points of reduction and its role in the socio-religious domain, whether structural, cultural, or operational.

***Buatulo Toulongo* as a Safeguard Mechanism**

The key finding of this study is that *Buatulo Toulongo* functions as a tripartite safeguard mechanism operating on three interrelated levels: structural, cultural, and operational. These three levels work simultaneously to create a defense system against the infiltration of radical ideology into religious spaces.

At the structural level, this system creates a mechanism of checks and balances that prevents the monopolization of religious authority. If there is a preacher who delivers a sermon with a harsh narrative, for instance, criticizing the government or prohibiting local customs, then *Buatulo Toulongo* immediately intervenes. *Bubato* will examine its legality, *Syara’* will attempt to engage him in theological dialogue, and *Baate* will remind him of local values.³¹ This synergy of *Buatulo Toulongo* minimizes the penetration

of intolerant groups into the mosque.³² The tripartite structure of *Buatulo Toulongo* implicitly creates what Suleman et al. term a *synergistic governance framework*,³³ in which political, religious, and customary authorities counterbalance one another.

The structural role of *Buatulo Toulongo* becomes even more effective when reinforced by cross-institutional coordination: “These three pillars coordinate with each other, involving all elements, including law enforcement agencies, interfaith leaders, NGOs, and preachers. With this forum, radical ideologies and deviant sects find it difficult to enter.”³⁴ This account reveals three points: first, the existence of tripartite coordination that functions as a reporting and response mechanism; second, the capacity for theological debate possessed by *Buatulo Syara’* to deconstruct radical narratives and prevent them from gaining legitimacy; third, integration with the formal security system through the *Buatulo Bubato* channel, which is connected to government apparatus.

At the cultural level, *Buatulo Toulongo* functions as a mechanism for transmitting *wasatiyyah* values conveyed through the performance of local identity, repeated in every ritual. From the perspective of Putnam’s social capital theory, this system represents *bonding social capital*: strong ties among community members who share a common identity and historical experience, which can be mobilized for collective resistance against external ideological threats.³⁵ This is not a bond artificially formed by government programs, but one that has grown organically from hundreds of years of shared history.

Lasapa reveals that, culturally, the authority to organize socio-religious events remains entirely in the hands of religious and customary leaders. The community still places *Buatulo Toulongo* in a central and honored position. “If there are groups that criticize traditions, saying that *tahlilan* (communal prayer for the dead) is a *bid’ah* (reprehensible innovation), that the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday (*maulid*) is *syirk* (polytheism), this will not significantly affect the socio-religious behavior of a community that still maintains religious traditions grounded in local wisdom.”³⁶

This statement indicates that the threat from radical groups is perceived by *Buatulo Toulongo* actors not merely in the dimension of physical violence, but in the more fundamental dimension of identity war. In a broader perspective, the practice of *Buatulo Toulongo*, which transmits moderation values through local identity, aligns with the classical Islamic legal maxim *al-’adah muhakkamah* (custom is legally authoritative), which opens a hermeneutic space for local traditions to be adapted into Islam without losing their religious identity.³⁷ In the Gorontalo context, the philosophy “*Adati hula-hulaa to saraa, saraa hula-hulaa to Kur’ani*” is a concrete manifestation of this maxim, where custom is not abolished but rather made a foundation for the implementation of *syari’ah*, a position that explicitly rejects the radical narrative that labels local traditions as *bid’ah* or *syirk*.

At the operational level, the equitable distribution of authority creates an institutional resistance not possessed by single-leadership mosque systems. Suwandris recounts a concrete incident: “There was an occasion when a preacher, in his sermon, seemed to disparage the government. After Friday prayers, a discussion took place between the imam, the subdistrict head, and the customary leader, which recommended that this preacher should no longer be given a schedule in our mosque.”³⁸ Ruly Henga confirms this statement: mosque administrators (*ta'mîr*) will not give space again to a preacher who holds intolerant views.³⁹ This case demonstrates how *Buatulo Toulongo* is not merely passively present, but actively performs operational safeguarding. The decision to revoke the preacher's schedule is a form of non-violent social sanction carried out collectively by the three authorities.

Operationally, the presence of *Buatulo Toulongo* functions as a signal to anyone, that this space is not devoid of oversight. The mosque projects its image as a protected, guarded space, not easily penetrated by narratives contrary to community consensus.

Contemporary Challenges to the Sustainability

Although the *Buatulo Toulongo* institution has proven to possess significant safeguarding capacity, this study identifies five serious factors that threaten its sustainability. Analyzing these five factors in depth is important because, without an accurate understanding of the root causes, revitalization interventions will tend to address symptoms rather than causes.

The first factor is the pressure of modernization and urbanization, which operates through two mechanisms simultaneously: value transformation and symbolic economic dislocation. From the perspective of value transformation, urban communities tend to view systems based on lineage and customary hierarchy as feudal artifacts that contradict the principles of egalitarianism and modern meritocracy. Samsi Pomalingo articulates this criticism clearly: “This system finds it difficult to embrace the fluid dynamics of society, is often considered exclusive, and provides little space for capable individuals without an appropriate customary background.”⁴⁰ This criticism reflects a real tension between the logic of ascription-based legitimacy (who you are genealogically) versus achievement-based legitimacy (what you can contribute). If *Buatulo Toulongo* fails to respond to this tension, it will become increasingly alienated from the generation growing up in a different value ecosystem.

From the perspective of symbolic economic dislocation, Faisal Alyafie reveals a more practical yet no less damaging problem: “The minimal availability of incentive funds to cover transportation costs is a major obstacle.”⁴¹ In the past, participation in *Buatulo Toulongo* was understood as a moral obligation within the framework of a moral economy, where social contribution received non-material communal legitimacy and appreciation. Modernity brings a different logic: any participation has an

economically measurable opportunity cost. In the absence of adequate material compensation, involvement in this tradition loses out to the demands of daily economic needs, especially for younger generations.

The second factor is the regeneration crisis of leadership, which constitutes the most acute existential threat to the sustainability of this system. The majority of *Buatulo Toulongo* practitioners are over fifty years old, while knowledge transmission takes place orally and is not formally institutionalized. Hairun Mahmud expresses a concern that cannot be ignored: “There are no identified heirs because the younger generation is more focused on jobs and careers.”⁴² Farid Babuta adds the dimension of transmission failure: the absence of a systematic socialization mechanism for the younger generation creates what can be called a cumulative knowledge gap, the longer the transmission gap lasts, the greater the volume of lost knowledge and the more difficult it becomes to recover. According to him, “Without regeneration, the tradition cannot continue; without an apparent practical function, the younger generation is reluctant to get involved.”⁴³

The regeneration crisis is further problematized by the phenomenon documented by van Bruinessen as the “conservative turn,” in which Nusantara Islam, accommodative of local culture, is criticized as inauthentic by groups adhering to more puritanical ideological orientations.⁴⁴ Many Gorontalo youth are identified as affiliated with Salafi-Wahhabi movements that view the accommodation between Islam and custom as deviation. They are not only reluctant to participate in *Buatulo Toulongo*; they actively question its legitimacy.⁴⁵ This is a double threat: a quantitative regeneration crisis (not enough people willing to participate) and a qualitative legitimation crisis (even those who exist doubt its relevance).

The third factor is religious ideological competition supported by far greater resources. There has been a proliferation of religious groups with various orientations, from moderate to conservative, all of which utilize mosques as bases for recruitment and ideological dissemination. Mooduto analyzes a fundamental resource disparity: “Radical groups have a comparative advantage in terms of organization, propaganda, structured da’wah materials, international networks, and funding, while *Buatulo Toulongo* depends almost entirely on the personal charisma and traditional legitimacy of its figures.”⁴⁶ This is an inequality that cannot be ignored. *Buatulo Toulongo*, as a faith-based institution, should play an effective role in counter-radicalism by strengthening its organizational capacity and network partnerships.

The fourth factor is Gorontalo’s strategic geographical vulnerability. This province is flanked by two zones with a track record of ideology-based conflict: Poso in Central Sulawesi and Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. Increased transportation connectivity through the Tomini Bay facilitates the mobility of combatants and the spread of ideologies. Asrul Lasapa acknowledges the fundamental limitation of *Buatulo Toulongo* in this context: “This system is effective for detection and response to internal threats, but less

effective against external threats, such as combatants who transit or temporarily hide in this region.”⁴⁷ In this context, *Buatulo Toulongo* faces a paradox: its strength, based on interpersonal trust, also becomes its weakness when confronted with anonymous and transnational threats.

The fifth factor, and the root of the entire structural problem, is the weak institutional and policy support. There is no regional regulation that explicitly recognizes, regulates, and supports *Buatulo Toulongo*. There is no specific budget allocation in the regional budget (*APBD*), and there is no systematic training program for young cadres. This condition causes the sustainability of this tradition to depend entirely on the initiative and dedication of particular individuals, a very fragile foundation for an institution claimed to be a collective defense mechanism. Hunowu adds a structural perspective: “Religious and customary leaders should also receive a state salary, not only government officials, so that tensions regarding *shadaqah* (voluntary contributions) can subside.”⁴⁸ Farid Babuta is even more emphatic: “Regulatory reinforcement through a Regional Regulation on Customary Institutions, Regent’s Decrees, and adequate budgets from the *APBD* are the primary keys to the sustainability of this system.”⁴⁹

Effectiveness and Revitalization of *Buatulo Toulongo*

The effectiveness of *Buatulo Toulongo* as a mechanism of religious moderation in Gorontalo represents an integration of historical, structural, cultural, and operational factors. This study proposes the *Tripartite Safeguard Model*, which identifies three elements that must operate simultaneously: structural safeguarding (distribution of authority), cultural safeguarding (transmission of values through local identity), and operational safeguarding (early detection based on social capital).

Structural effectiveness is rooted in the division of authority that cannot be reduced to a single hierarchy. From the perspective of structuration theory, *Buatulo Toulongo* is a social structure recursively reproduced by its agents. Every collective ritual reproduces the authority that prevents the monopoly of truth interpretation. This reproduction creates greater resilience compared to top-down regulations because it depends on internalization, not external enforcement. recommends three urgent institutional interventions: customary deliberation (*Dulohupa lo ulipu*), the restructuring of customary institutions that currently suffer from dualism, and the publication and digitalization of a customary guidebook.⁵⁰

Cultural effectiveness lies in the ability to transform theological abstractions into a living identity. Hunowu warns of the danger of overly exclusive social ties, as this can give rise to a “us” (*ami*) versus “them” (*timongoliyo*) mentality, a condition vulnerable to manipulation by radical narratives.⁵¹ From the perspective of social capital theory, *bonding social capital* must be balanced with *bridging social capital*. Therefore, the Tripartite Safeguard Model explicitly requires a balance between these two forms of capital.

Revitalization must also be carried out in an integrated manner across three dimensions. First, culturally, there is a need to reframe the narrative from “feudal tradition” to “deliberative democratic mechanism” that aligns with the principle of checks and balances. Pomalingo recommends the refunctionalization of customary institutions as modern centers of peace literacy, the training of customary leaders as communicators for young people, and the integration of customary curricula into formal education in a casual and practical style.⁵² Second, institutionally, formal recognition is required through Regional Regulations (*Peraturan Daerah*), budget allocation, and connection with the national religious moderation programs of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Third, gender and youth inclusion constitute a strategic aspect. Hunowu emphasizes the need for women as active partners, given that the *buatulo* system has thus far been dominated by men.⁵³ Samsi Pomalingo adds the necessity of opening participation without being rigidly bound by lineage, even if this proves controversial among conservative circles.⁵⁴ The strategic rationale is as follows: radical groups are highly aggressive in recruiting women and youth. If *Buatulo Toulongo* does not open itself to these same demographics, it will face a strategic imbalance, safeguarding is carried out by elders, while radical recruitment targets the younger generation who remain beyond the system’s reach.

Ultimately, the revitalization of *Buatulo Toulongo* is a matter of adaptation without loss of essence. This system has survived for centuries not because it is static, but precisely because it has been able to adapt—from the pre-Islamic era to the Islamic era, from the kingdom system to the republic. Contemporary challenges demand the next round of adaptation: from oral tradition to digital documentation, from exclusive institution to inclusive institution, and from ceremonial practice to an active safeguarding mechanism equipped with legal legitimacy, material resources, and network capacity. This adaptation is not a betrayal of ancestral heritage; rather, it is the most faithful way to transmit its spirit into contemporary reality. It seems that similar challenges are also faced by other traditions and therefore other effort to such ends can be replicated here and vice versa.⁵⁵

Conclusion

This study has empirically demonstrated that *Buatulo Toulongo*, the traditional tripartite leadership system of Gorontalo integrating governmental, religious (*‘ulamâ*), and customary authorities, functions effectively as a safeguard mechanism against radicalism infiltration in mosques. Its effectiveness operates on three mutually reinforcing levels: structural (creating checks and balances that prevent monopolization of religious interpretation), cultural (transmitting *wasathiyyah* values through symbolically positioned local identity), and operational (functioning as an early warning system through pre-prayer coordination and informal social capital-based surveillance). Observation data from fifteen mosques indicate that those with active *Buatulo Toulongo* consistently demonstrate higher resistance to radical ideological penetration.

Nevertheless, the system faces five mutually reinforcing existential threats: modernization and urbanization eroding its social base; a leadership regeneration crisis; ideological competition from better-resourced groups; strategic geographical vulnerability; and weak institutional support. The study introduces three academic contributions: the Tripartite Safeguard Model, the conceptualization of mosques as ideological contestation arenas, and a balanced social capital strategy for counter-radicalism. Policy implications are urgent, particularly the necessity of regional regulations recognizing *Buatulo Toulongo* as a protective institution for religious moderation.

References

- Ali Mobiliu, Customary Practitioner of Gorontalo, June 5, 2022, and May 17, 2025.
- Alim Niode, Executive Chairman of the Gorontalo Provincial Customary Council (*Dewan Adat Provinsi Gorontalo*), May 23, 2022.
- Aljunied, Khairudin. *Shapers of Islam in Southeast Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022.
- Alkatiri, Zeffry. "The Branding Serambi Madinah: Half-Hearted Politics of Identity in Gorontalo City." *Religious* 5, no. 3 (2021): 375–86. <https://doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v5i3.11533>
- Amin Pulumolo, Secretary of the Baiturrahim Mosque Board (*Badan Takmirul Baiturrahim*), Gorontalo City, June 12, 2025.
- Amri, Yaser, Yogi Febriandi, and Phaison Da-Oh. "Religious Moderation Unveiled: The Intersection of Textual and Contextual Approaches to Understanding Indonesian Muslims." *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 48, no. 1 (2024): 105–25. <http://dx.doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v48i1.1207>
- Anwar, M. Syafi'i. "Shifting Ideology and Religiopolitical Behavior of Conservative and Radical Islam in Contemporary Indonesia." *Religió: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama* 15, no. 1 (2025): 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.15642/religio.v15i1.3208>
- Asrul Lasapa, Head of the Islamic Community Guidance Division, Regional Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Gorontalo Province, June 18, 2025.
- Basyir, Kunawi. "Fighting Islamic Radicalism Through Religious Moderatism in Indonesia: An Analysis of Religious Movement." *Esensia* 21, no. 2 (2020): 205–20. <https://doi.org/10.14421/esensia.v21i2.2313>
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Bruinessen, Martin van, ed. *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn."* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013.
- Daulima, Farha. *Dialog Tentang Budaya Daerah*. Limboto: Mbu' Bungale, 2008.
- DeVault, Marjorie L., and Liza McCoy. "Institutional Ethnography: Using Interviews to

- Investigate Ruling Relations.” In *Institutional Ethnography as Practice*, edited by Dorothy E. Smith, 15–44. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
- Erawadi, and Fadlan Masykura Setiadi. “Exploring Religious Harmony Through Dalihan Na Tolu: Local Wisdom in Peacebuilding in Indonesia.” *Jurnal Ilmiah Peuradeun* 12, no. 3 (2024): 1379–1408. <https://doi.org/10.26811/peuradeun.v12i3.1398>
- Faisal Alyafie, Religious Leader and *Kadli* (Islamic Judge) of North Gorontalo, June 12, 2025.
- Farid Babuta, Subdistrict Head and Customary Practitioner of Gorontalo, June 12, 2025.
- Fata, Ahmad Khoirul, and Moh Nor Ichwan. “Pertarungan Kuasa Dalam Wacana Islam Nusantara.” *Islamica* 11, no. 2 (2017): 339–64. <https://doi.org/10.15642/islamica.2017.11.2.339-364>
- Fauzan, and Ahmad Khoirul Fata. “Deconstructing the Concept of Jihad By the Radical Islamic Movements.” In *1st RIICMuSSS*, 253–57. Lampung: Atlantis Press, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.201113.048>
- Fuadi, Moh. Ashif, Abd Faishol, A. Rifa’i, Yunika Triana, and Rustam Ibrahim. “Religious Moderation in the Context of Integration between Religion and Local Culture in Indonesia.” *Journal of Al-Tamaddun* 19, no. 1 (2024): 47–59. <https://doi.org/10.22452/jat.vol19no1.4>
- H.T. Mooduto, Member of the Board of Management of Masjid Al-Marhamah, Suwawa, May 25, 2022.
- Hairun, Administrator of the Al-Marhamah Mosque, Suwawa, May 25, 2025.
- Harahap, Sumper M., and Hamka. “Investigating the Roles of Philosophy, Culture, Language and Islam in Angkola’s Local Wisdom of ‘Dalihan Na Tolu.’” *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies* 79, no. 1 (2023): 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v79i1.8164>
- Ibrahim, Afandi. “Sepanjang 2022, Densus 88 Tangkap 11 Teroris Dari Gorontalo.” *Liputan6.com*, n.d.
- KH. Abdul Rasyid Kamaru, *Kadli* (Islamic Judge) of Gorontalo City, April 4, 2022.
- Lipoeto, M. *Sedjarah Gorontalo: Dua Lima Pohalaa*. Gorontalo: Pertjetakan Ra’jat Gorontalo, 1949.
- M. Lukum, Head of the People’s Welfare Section of Gorontalo City, May 25, 2022.
- Merdeka.com. “Survei BNPT: Lima Daerah Ini Memiliki Potensi Radikal Cukup Tinggi.” *merdeka.com*, 2017. <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/survei-bnpt-lima-daerah-ini-memiliki-potensi-radikal-cukup-tinggi.html>.
- Momy A. Hunowu, Academic and Scholar of Islam and Gorontalo Culture, June 22, 2025.
- Muhtar, Fathurrahman. “Toward Religious Moderation: Mohammed Arkoun’s and Hasan Hanafi’s Perspectives on Indonesian Wasatiyah Islam.” *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 47, no. 2 (2023): 204–21. <http://dx.doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v47i2.1119>

- Mujani, Wan Kamal, Ahmad Munawar Ismail, and Nurfida'iy Salahuddin. "The Threat of Radical Thinking and Extremism in the Nusantara (Malay Archipelago)." *Islamiyyat: The International Journal of Islamic Studies* 42, no. 1 (2020): 85–92. <https://doi.org/10.17576/islamiyyat-2020-4201-10>
- Muzayyin, M., Nadia Raifah Nawa Kartika, and Habibullah Habib. "In Search of Moderation of Islam Against Extremism: A Promoting 'Islam Pribumi' By Gus Dur." *FIKRAH* 9, no. 2 (2021): 203–14. <https://doi.org/10.21043/fikrah.v9i2.10111>
- Najib, Muhammad Ainun, and Ahmad Khoirul Fata. "Islam Wasatiyah Dan Kontestasi Wacana Moderatisme Islam Di Indonesia." *Theologia* 31, no. 1 (2020): 115–38. <https://doi.org/10.21580/teo.2020.31.1.5764>
- Nofialdi, and Siska Rianti. "The Distribution of Pusako Randah Property in Minangkabau Society: Between Cultural Tradition and Islamic Law Provision." *Mazahib Jurnal Pemikiran Hukum Islam* 23, no. 1 (2024): 271–304. <https://doi.org/10.21093/mj.v23i1.7257>
- Nur, Samin Rajak. "Beberapa Aspek Hukum Adat Tata Negara Kerajaan Gorontalo Pada Masa Pemerintahan Eyato 1673-1679." Universitas Hasanuddin, 1979.
- Putnam, Robert D. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.
- Qoumas, Yaqut Cholil, Rosila Bee Binti Mohd. Hussain, and Rahimin Affandi Bin Abdul Rahim. "The Dissemination of Religious Moderation Through the Policy of the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs." *Qijis* 12, no. 1 (2024): 147–74. <https://doi.org/10.21043/qijis.v12i1.27552>
- Rionaldi Doe, Customary Practitioner of Gorontalo, May 25, 2022, and May 21, 2025.
- Ruly Henga, Secretary of the Baiturrahman Grand Mosque Board (*Badan Takmirul Masjid Agung Baiturrahman*), Limboto, June 22, 2025.
- Sahrul, and Afrahul Fadhila Daulai. "Kearifan Lokal Dalihan Na Tolu, Ninik Mamak Dan Kerapatan Adat Nagari Dalam Menjaga Kerukunan AntarumatBeragama Di Sumatera Barat Dan Sumatera Utara." *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 43, no. 2 (2019): 300–323. <https://doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v43i2.606>
- Samsi Pomalingo, Academic and Anthropologist specializing in Gorontalo, June 22, 2025.
- Saumantri, Theguh. "The Dialectic of Islam Nusantara and Its Contribution To The Development of Religious Moderation In Indonesia." *Fokus* 7, no. 1 (2022): 58–67. <https://doi.org/10.29240/jf.v7i1.4295>
- Smith, Dorothy E. *Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for People*. Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2005.
- Sopyan, Imam, Pepen Irpan Fauzan, and Ahmad Khoirul Fata. "Religious Harmony, Godly Nationalism, and the Limits of State-Sponsored Interreligious Dialogue Agenda in Indonesia." *Islamika Inside: Jurnal Keislaman Dan Humaniora* 6, no. 2 (2021): 31–53. <https://doi.org/10.35719/islamikainside.v6i2.113>

- Suleman, Zulfitri Z, Donald Qomaidiasyah Tungkagi, Zulkarnain Suleman, Sofyan A.P Kau, and Mohd Afandi Salleh. "Negotiating Islamic Moderation: The Interplay of Sharia and Local Culture in Gorontalo, Minangkabau, and Banten." *Jurnal Ilmiah Al- Syir'ah* 23, no. 1 (2025): 50–68. <http://dx.doi.org/10.30984/jis.v23i1.3527>
- Suwandris, Administrator of the Baiturrahman Mosque Board (*Badan Takmirul Masjid*), May 25, 2025.
- Tim Pokja Moderasi Bergama. *Peta Jalan (Roadmap) Penguatan Moderasi Beragama 2020-2024*. Kementerian Agama RI. Jakarta: Kementerian Agama RI, 2020.
- Winarto, Yudho. "Terduga Teroris Anggota Al Qaeda Di Gorontalo Ditangkap Densus 88." Kontan.co.id, n.d.

Endnotes:

¹ Wan Kamal Mujani, Ahmad Munawar Ismail, and Nurfida'iy Salahuddin, "The Threat of Radical Thinking and Extremism in the Nusantara (Malay Archipelago)," *Islamiyyat: The International Journal of Islamic Studies* 42, no. 1 (2020): 85–92, <https://doi.org/10.17576/islamiyyat-2020-4201-10>; Fauzan and Ahmad Khoiril Fata, "Deconstructing the Concept of Jihad By the Radical Islamic Movements," in *1st RIICMuSSS* (Lampung: Atlantis Press, 2019), 253–57, <https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.201113.048>

² Khairudin Aljunied, *Shapers of Islam in Southeast Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), 2.

³ M. Syafi'i Anwar, "Shifting Ideology and Religiopolitical Behavior of Conservative and Radical Islam in Contemporary Indonesia," *Religió: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama* 15, no. 1 (2025): 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.15642/religio.v15i1.3208>

⁴ Tim Pokja Moderasi Beragama, *Peta Jalan (Roadmap) Penguatan Moderasi Beragama 2020-2024, Kementerian Agama RI* (Jakarta: Kementerian Agama RI, 2020); Muhammad Ainun Najib and Ahmad Khoiril Fata, "Islam Wasatiyah Dan Kontestasi Wacana Moderatisme Islam Di Indonesia," *Theologia* 31, no. 1 (2020): 115–38, <https://doi.org/10.21580/teo.2020.31.1.5764>

⁵ Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, Rosila Bee Binti Mohd. Hussain, and Rahimin Affandi Bin Abdul Rahim, "The Dissemination of Religious Moderation Through the Policy of the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs," *Qijis* 12, no. 1 (2024): 147–74, <https://doi.org/10.21043/qijis.v12i1.27552>

⁶ Yaser Amri, Yogi Febriandi, and Phaison Da-Oh, "Religious Moderation Unveiled: The Intersection of Textual and Contextual Approaches to Understanding Indonesian Muslims," *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 48, no. 1 (2024): 105–25, <http://dx.doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v48i1.1207>; Imam Sopyan, Pepen Irpan Fauzan, and Ahmad Khoiril Fata, "Religious Harmony, Godly Nationalism, and the Limits of State-Sponsored Interreligious Dialogue Agenda in Indonesia," *Islamika Inside: Jurnal Keislaman Dan Humaniora* 6, no. 2 (2021): 31–53, <https://doi.org/10.35719/islamikainside.v6i2.113>

⁷ Kunawi Basyir, "Fighting Islamic Radicalism Through Religious Moderatism in Indonesia: An Analysis of Religious Movement," *Esensia* 21, no. 2 (2020): 205–20, <https://doi.org/10.14421/esensia.v21i2.2313>; M. Muzayyin, Nadia Raifah Nawa Kartika, and Habibullah Habib, "In Search of Moderation of Islam Against Extremism: A Promoting 'Islam Pribumi' By Gus Dur," *FIKRAH* 9, no. 2 (2021): 203–14, <https://doi.org/10.21043/fikrah.v9i2.10111>; Theguh Saumantri, "The Dialectic of Islam Nusantara and Its Contribution To The Development of Religious Moderation In Indonesia," *Fokus* 7, no. 1 (2022): 58–67, <https://doi.org/10.29240/jf.v7i1.4295>; Ahmad Khoiril Fata and Moh Nor Ichwan, "Pertarungan Kuasa Dalam Wacana Islam Nusantara," *Islamica* 11, no. 2 (2017): 339–64, <https://doi.org/10.15642/islamica.2017.11.2.339-364>; Sahrul and Afrahul Fadhila Daulai, "Kearifan Lokal Dalihan Na Tolu, Ninik Mamak Dan Kerapatan Adat Nagari Dalam Menjaga Kerukunan Antarumat Beragama Di Sumatera Barat Dan Sumatera Utara," *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 43, no. 2 (2019): 300–323, <https://doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v43i2.606>; Sumper M. Harahap and Hamka, "Investigating the Roles of Philosophy, Culture, Language and Islam in Angkola's Local Wisdom of 'Dalihan Na Tolu,'" *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies* 79, no. 1 (2023): 1–10, <https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v79i1.8164>

⁸ Moh. Ashif Fuadi et al., "Religious Moderation in the Context of Integration between Religion and Local Culture in Indonesia," *Journal of Al-Tamaddun* 19, no. 1 (2024): 47–59, <https://doi.org/10.22452/jat.vol19no1.4>

⁹ Zulfitri Z Suleman et al., "Negotiating Islamic Moderation: The Interplay of Sharia and Local Culture in Gorontalo, Minangkabau, and Banten," *Jurnal Ilmiah Al-Syir'ah* 23, no. 1 (2025): 50–68, <http://dx.doi.org/10.30984/jis.v23i1.3527>

¹⁰ M. Lipoeto, *Sedjarah Gorontalo: Dua Lima Pohalaa* (Gorontalo: Pertjetakan Ra'jat Gorontalo, 1949), 13.

¹¹ Zeffry Alkatiri, "The Branding Serambi Madinah: Half-Hearted Politics of Identity in Gorontalo City," *Religious* 5, no. 3 (2021): 375–86, <https://doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v5i3.11533>

¹² Merdeka.com, “Survei BNPT: Lima Daerah Ini Memiliki Potensi Radikal Cukup Tinggi,” merdeka.com, 2017, <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/survei-bnpt-lima-daerah-ini-memiliki-potensi-radikal-cukup-tinggi.html>.

¹³ Afandi Ibrahim, “Sepanjang 2022, Densus 88 Tangkap 11 Teroris Dari Gorontalo,” Liputan6.com, n.d.

¹⁴ Yudho Winarto, “Terduga Teroris Anggota Al Qaeda Di Gorontalo Ditangkap Densus 88,” Kontan.co.id, n.d.

¹⁵ Dorothy E. Smith, *Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for People* (Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2005), 87.

¹⁶ Marjorie L. DeVault and Liza McCoy, “Institutional Ethnography: Using Interviews to Investigate Ruling Relations,” in *Institutional Ethnography as Practice*, ed. Dorothy E. Smith (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 15–44.

¹⁷ Keputusan Direktur Jenderal Bimbingan Masyarakat Islam Nomor Dj.II/802 Tahun 2014 Tentang Standar Pembinaan Manajemen Masjid

¹⁸ Lipoeto, *Sedjarah Gorontalo: Dua Lima Pahalaa*.

¹⁹ Interview with Ali Mobiliu, Customary Practitioner of Gorontalo, June 5, 2022, and May 17, 2025.

²⁰ Samin Rajak Nur, “Beberapa Aspek Hukum Adat Tata Negara Kerajaan Gorontalo Pada Masa Pemerintahan Eyato 1673-1679” (Universitas Hasanuddin, 1979), 107.

²¹ Suleman et al., “Negotiating Islamic Moderation: The Interplay of Sharia and Local Culture in Gorontalo, Minangkabau, and Banten.”

²² Interview with Rionaldi Doe, Customary Practitioner of Gorontalo, May 25, 2022.

²³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 19.

²⁴ Farha Daulima, *Dialog Tentang Budaya Daerah* (Limboto: Mbu’ Bungale, 2008), 56.

²⁵ Daulima, *Dialog Tentang Budaya Daerah*.

²⁶ Interview with KH. Abdul Rasyid Kamaru, *Kadli* (Islamic Judge) of Gorontalo City, April 4, 2022.

²⁷ Fathurrahman Muhtar, “Toward Religious Moderation: Mohammed Arkoun’s and Hasan Hanafi’s Perspectives on Indonesian Wasatiah Islam,” *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 47, no. 2 (2023): 212, <http://dx.doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v47i2.1119>

²⁸ Interview with Suwandris, Administrator of the Baiturrahman Mosque Board (*Badan Takmirul Masjid*), May 25, 2025.

²⁹ Interview with Farid Babuta, Subdistrict Head and Customary Practitioner of Gorontalo, June 12, 2025.

³⁰ Interview with Alim Niode, Executive Chairman of the Gorontalo Provincial Customary Council (*Dewan Adat Provinsi Gorontalo*), May 23, 2022.

³¹ Interview with M. Lukum, Head of the People’s Welfare Section of Gorontalo City, May 25, 2022.

³² Interview with Amin Polumolo, Secretary of the Baiturrahim Mosque Board (*Badan Takmirul Baiturrahim*), Gorontalo City, June 12, 2025.

³³ Suleman et al., “Negotiating Islamic Moderation: The Interplay of Sharia and Local Culture in Gorontalo, Minangkabau, and Banten.”

³⁴ Interview with Farid Babuta, June 12, 2025.

³⁵ Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 39.

³⁶ Interview with Asrul Lasapa, Head of the Islamic Community Guidance Division, Regional Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Gorontalo Province, June 18, 2025.

³⁷ Fuadi et al., “Religious Moderation in the Context of Integration between Religion and Local Culture in Indonesia.”

³⁸ Interview with Suwandris, May 25, 2025.

³⁹ Interview with Ruly Henga, Secretary of the Baiturrahman Grand Mosque Board (*Badan Takmirul Masjid Agung Baiturrahman*), Limboto, June 22, 2025.

⁴⁰ Interview with Samsi Pomalingo, Academic and Anthropologist specializing in Gorontalo, June 22, 2025.

⁴¹ Interview with Faisal Alyafie, Religious Leader and *Kadli* (Islamic Judge) of North Gorontalo, June 12, 2025.

⁴² Interview with Hairun, Administrator of the Al-Marhamah Mosque, Suwawa, May 25, 2025.

⁴³ Interview with Farid Babuta, June 12, 2025.

⁴⁴ Martin van Bruinessen, ed., *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn"* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013), 12.

⁴⁵ Interview with Asrul Lasapa, June 18, 2025.

⁴⁶ Interview with H.T. Mooduto, Member of the Board of Management of Masjid Al-Marhamah, Suwawa, May 25, 2022.

⁴⁷ Interview with Asrul Lasapa, June 18, 2025.

⁴⁸ Interview with Momy A. Hunowu, Academic and Scholar of Islam and Gorontalo Culture, June 22, 2025.

⁴⁹ Interview with Farid Babuta, June 12, 2025.

⁵⁰ Interview with Rionaldi Doe, May 21, 2025.

⁵¹ Interview with Momy A. Hunowu, June 22, 2025.

⁵² Interview with Samsi Pomalingo, June 22, 2025.

⁵³ Interview with Momy A. Hunowu, June 22, 2025.

⁵⁴ Interview with Samsi Pomalingo, June 22, 2025.

⁵⁵ Nofialdi and Siska Rianti, "The Distribution of Pusako Randah Property in Minangkabau Society: Between Cultural Tradition and Islamic Law Provision," *Mazahib Jurnal Pemikiran Hukum Islam* 23, no. 1 (2024): 271–304, <https://doi.org/10.21093/mj.v23i1.7257>; Sahrul and Daulai, "Kearifan Lokal Dalihan Na Tolu, Ninik Mamak Dan Kerapatan Adat Nagari Dalam Menjaga Kerukunan Antarumat Beragama Di Sumatera Barat Dan Sumatera Utara.,"; Erawadi and Fadlan Masykura Setiadi, "Exploring Religious Harmony Through Dalihan Na Tolu: Local Wisdom in Peacebuilding in Indonesia," *Jurnal Ilmiah Peuradeun* 12, no. 3 (2024): 1379–1408, <https://doi.org/10.26811/peuradeun.v12i3.1398>